

ASML HOLDING N.V.

REMUNERATION REPORT FY 2009

Foreword

Dear stakeholder,

In this Remuneration Report you will find remuneration details of the Board of Management of ASML Holding N.V. ("ASML" or the "Company"). The report describes the policy and its results and is in line with Dutch legal and corporate governance disclosure requirements.

In summary:

- The Remuneration Policy as adopted by the Shareholders on April 3, 2008 calls for a base pay and a variable part paid in cash or accrued in Options and Shares; the levels awarded depend on achievement related to targets set.
- In view of the economic crisis starting end of 2008 and lasting into 2009, total remuneration accrued was reduced by roughly 20% in 2008 and 2009 compared to 2007 (see table 1 of the Appendix).
- As a way to lessen the cash burden on the Company, the full Board of Management has accepted the proposal of the Supervisory Board that 1/3 of the 2008 variable cash incentive was transferred into stock and blocked for 1 year.
- Payment of the 2009 cash variable payment will be delayed until the Company reaches EUR 100 million cumulative operating income after two consecutive quarters after December 31, 2009, so that no variable cash income is paid to the Board of Management during a period of loss.

The Supervisory Board

Introduction

The Remuneration Committee of ASML advises the Supervisory Board, and prepares resolutions, with respect to the review and execution of the Remuneration Policy as adopted by the General Meeting of Shareholders on April 3, 2008 (the "2008 Remuneration Policy"). The 2008 Remuneration Policy, which was applicable in 2009, is a revision of the formerly adopted Remuneration Policies of 2004 and 2006. The Supervisory Board approves the proposals of the Remuneration Committee and, in case of policy changes, submits the proposed remuneration policy to the General Meeting of Shareholders for adoption. The members of our Remuneration Committee are Jos W.B. Westerburgen (chairman), Ieke C.J. van den Burg and Pauline F.M. van der Meer Mohr (as of March 26, 2009).

The Remuneration Committee:

- oversees the development and implementation of compensation and benefits programs for members of the Board of Management;
- reviews and proposes the corporate goals and objectives relevant to the compensation of all members of the Board of Management, in cooperation with the Audit Committee and the Technology & Strategy Committee;
- evaluates the performance of members of the Board of Management in view of these goals and objectives, in cooperation with the Audit Committee and the Technology & Strategy Committee, and recommends to the Supervisory Board the resulting compensation levels of the members of the Board of Management, based on this evaluation. The remuneration packages of senior and executive management are aligned with these recommendations;
- analyzes possible outcomes of the variable remuneration components and assesses how they may affect remuneration for the Board of Management (scenario analyses);
- reviews and proposes the compensation policy for the Supervisory Board.

In 2009, the Remuneration Committee met six times in scheduled meetings, and several times on an ad-hoc basis. In 2009 the Remuneration Committee studied the amended Dutch Corporate Governance Code, which came into effect on January 1, 2009 (the "Code"), and simultaneously studied developments in top executive remuneration in the market place. As a result of this the Supervisory Board will submit a proposal for amendment of the 2008 Remuneration Policy to the General Meeting of Shareholders to be held on March 24, 2010.

In proposing to the Supervisory Board the actual remuneration elements and levels, the Remuneration Committee considers, among other factors, whether these are still competitive. External compensation survey data for 2009 and Towers Watson as external advisor, were used to benchmark our remuneration levels and structures. Towers Watson acts as the advisor to the Remuneration Committee and does not perform any other services for ASML's Board of Management.

Remuneration Report 2009

In this report we will account for the remuneration of the Board of Management over 2009 according to the 2008 Remuneration Policy. This policy results in a transparent and robust remuneration program which is in compliance with the applicable Corporate Governance guidelines. The application of the 2008 Remuneration Policy in 2009 for the remuneration for the Board of Management has been influenced by the special business circumstances of 2009.

Total remuneration

The total remuneration contains base salary and benefits, a short-term performance cash bonus and short-term performance stock options and long-term performance stock. It aims to balance and align the remuneration with short-term execution and long-term elements of the managerial tasks of Management. This is achieved by using, for the CEO, for at target performance, the ratio of 100 – 75 – 25 – 55 between base salary, short-term performance cash bonus, short-term performance stock options and long-term performance stock. For the other members of the Board of Management this ratio is 100 – 60 – 25 – 55, for at target performance. This differentiation was introduced in 2008 to better reflect the competitiveness of the remuneration. Furthermore, overachievement on targets set for short-term performance stock options and long-term performance stock will be rewarded.

The balance as set in the 2008 Remuneration Policy was appropriately in line with the desire to emphasize pay for performance in the short and longer term. In 2009, the Remuneration Committee reviewed this balance in light of the amended Code. In its analysis, the Remuneration Committee included the risk profile of the Company, the ex ante and ex post relation between pay and performance as well as the long term strategy of ASML.

Benchmark

Given the international composition of ASML's business as well as ASML's staff, the total of base salary and short- and long-term incentives will be measured by referencing to the median level of the appropriate top executive pay market practices by benchmarking positions. The Remuneration Committee has assessed compensation levels against a Dutch reference market consisting of among others AEX and AMX listed companies and a reference market consisting of a balanced group of European companies in the ICT and Technology sector. Size parameters that were taken into account when interpreting the comparability in size included revenue, number of employees and market capitalization. A prudent and conservative approach has been taken in interpreting the results.

Base salary

The level of base salary is not separately benchmarked, but derived from the median level of the benchmark on Total Direct Compensation of the appropriate top executive reference market, as described above. Base salaries are adjusted upon discretion of the Supervisory Board in line with changes in market competitiveness and the salary developments for other ASML employees. Given the economic circumstances, base salaries in 2009 were fixed on the level of 2008.

Performance Bonus

The annual performance bonus has an 'on target' level of 75% (for the CEO) or 60% (for the other members of the Board of Management) of base salary. The bonus payouts are pro-rated linearly to the level of achievement of six performance criteria. Four of these performance criteria are based on the achievement of measurable financial, operational and market targets and one criterion is based on technology related objectives. The weighting of each of these five criteria is equal (in total weighted 80%). These quantitative objectives are measurable and include milestones reflecting the quality of the performance achieved. A sixth target is set on annual qualitative objectives (weighted 20%). Targets are set at the beginning of the performance period. The target setting and measuring period of the first five targets is in general semi-annual, which allows alignment of the targets to the then relevant business objectives. The target setting and measuring period of the sixth target is annual. The payout of the Performance Bonus is annual.

In view of the economic downturn, the short term performance criteria for 2009 were formulated to express the special challenges ASML faced in coping with this downturn. Also in view of the total freeze of ASML's market in the first half of 2009, Market Share has been changed into Market Position, not only expressing Market Share as such, but also including ASML's customer intimacy as a measure of the sustainability of ASML's success in the market place. Gross Margin % of Sales and Net Operating Profit were replaced by Direct Material Margin on New Systems and Total Company Cost Base. These criteria are a better indicator of the result ASML makes on its core business. "Sustainability of Cost Base savings" was used for the first half of 2009 to reflect the urgency of cost reductions whilst ensuring a lasting lower cost base.

The short-term performance criteria for 2009 were:

1. Market Position (target set and measured on an annual basis)
2. Total Company Cost Base
- 3a. Sustainability of Cost Base savings (for the first half of 2009)
- 3b. Direct Material Margin (for the second half of 2009)
4. Operating Cash Flow in Euro
5. Technology Leadership Index
6. A qualitative target based on agreed key objectives

The cash bonus is accrued during the performance period.

In view of the exceptional economic circumstances in 2009 and the desire to adhere to the highest standards of good corporate governance, the Supervisory Board has decided to postpone the payment of the accrued performance bonus FY 2009 until ASML has made a cumulative income from operations of at least 100 million Euro in two consecutive quarters after December 31, 2009.

Performance Stock Options

Performance stock options are granted under the condition of fulfilment of predetermined performance targets, which are set and measured semi-annually. The performance measure for obtaining performance stock options is the meeting of a Return on Average Invested Capital ("ROAIC") target over a one year period. The combination of performance stock options with this measure ensures that the Board of Management receives a benefit only if the achieved ROAIC performance target leads to a long term share price appreciation.

ROAIC shows ASML's cash rate of return on capital it has put to work, regardless of the capital structure of the Company. In other words ROAIC is a fundamental metric to measure the value creation of the Company and is used in the strategic review of company performance throughout the year. In order to calculate ROAIC two components are used: net operating profit (NOP) and average invested capital (AIC). ROAIC is then defined as:

$$\text{ROAIC} = \text{NOP} / \text{AIC}.$$

Depending on the actual realization versus the targeted level of achievement, a number of stock options is granted.

The number of performance stock options which can be granted for 'on target' achievement equals 25% of base salary divided by the value of one performance stock option. Although ASML defines stretching targets, there is also a possibility to reward overachievement (also set at a certain predefined level). In case of higher achievements than 'on target', the maximum number of performance stock options for such overachievement can reach 50% of base salary.

The exact number of performance stock options to be granted unconditionally, is calculated – based on audited results - at the end of the performance period, pro-rated linearly to the level of achievement of actual ROAIC. The number of performance stock options is accrued during the calendar year in which the conditional award is done.

In 2008 the Supervisory Board decided that the maximum number of performance stock options to be granted conditionally in 2009 would be equal to the maximum of performance stock options in 2008. The reasoning behind this was the fact that in 2008 a benchmark on

Board of Management remuneration was performed taking into account the years 2008 and 2009. The 2008 Remuneration Policy submitted to and adopted by the 2008 General Meeting of Shareholders included measures also covering a period of two years, among others fixing the number of conditional options for a two-year period.

The calculation was made according to the following methodology:

The value of the performance stock option was determined in 2008 by using the objective binomial Cox Ross Rubinstein valuation method and a performance discount of 30% in line with market practice. The value was calculated at the beginning of the 2008 performance period, on the day of publication of ASML's annual results of FY 2007, using the market value of the underlying stock during the three preceding years.

Whilst employed with ASML the performance stock options will not be exercised in the three years after the date of conditional grant.

Performance Stock

Performance stock will be awarded yearly under the condition of fulfilment of a predetermined performance target, which is measured over a period of three calendar years. The performance measure for obtaining performance stock is ASML's relative ROAIC position compared to the Peer Group at the end of the three years.

The strategic metric of ROAIC is therefore not just measured in absolute terms, but referenced against a peer group over a longer period of time. This longer term relative comparison validates the ambition level of the absolute ROAIC targets set for the Performance Stock Options.

The Peer Group which is used for the measurement of ASML's relative ROAIC position consists of KLA-Tencor, Varian Semiconductor, Applied Materials, Novellus, Cymer, Lam Research, MKS Instruments, Advanced Energy, Asyst and ASMI.

The number of performance stock is awarded relative to the targeted ROAIC position and the obtained ROAIC position at the end of the three year performance period.

The number of performance stock to be awarded in case of 'on target' achievement equals 55% of base salary divided by the value of one performance stock. Although ASML defines stretching targets, there is also a possibility to reward overachievement (also set at a certain predefined level). In case of higher achievements than the 'on target' performance the maximum number of performance stock for such overachievement can reach 175% of the 'on target' level, meaning 96.25% of base salary. The exact number of performance stock to be awarded unconditionally, is calculated at the end of the performance period, pro-rated to the level of the actual versus targeted ROAIC position obtained after three years. The number of performance stock is accrued during the calendar year in which the conditional award is done.

The target setting for each conditional award is based on the circumstances and expectations then prevailing for a three year period. In very exceptional cases, where unforeseen business circumstances require and justify an adaptation of the ultimate target originally set, the Supervisory Board will have the discretion to do so.

In 2008 the Supervisory Board decided that the maximum number of performance stock to be granted conditionally in 2009 would be equal to the maximum of performance stock determined for 2008, on the basis of the same reasoning as set out under Performance Stock Options.

The calculation was made according to the following methodology:

- The value of the performance stock for 2008 was determined by using the market value of the stock on the day of publication of ASML's annual results of FY 2007 in line with US GAAP and applying a performance discount of 30% in line with market practice. The market value is determined at the beginning of the performance period, on the day of publication of ASML's annual results in the year in which the targets are set, using the value of the underlying stock during the three preceding years.

Once the stock is released after fulfilment of the performance condition, the stock is retained by the Board of Management member for at least two years after the date of the unconditional

award or until the termination of employment, whichever period is shorter. As the date of the unconditional award lies three years after the date of conditional award and the Board of Management member has to retain the stock for at least two subsequent years, the period before one obtains full rights to the stock will be five years in total. The Remuneration Committee considers the total period to be in compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. In so far as taxation is due in respect of the released stock, the Board of Management Member will be allowed to sell unconditionally awarded stock with a value equal to the amount of tax due.

Benefits

ASML offers its Board of Management members a pension plan based on a defined contribution. The total defined contribution is a percentage of the pensionable salary and is dependent on the participant's age at the beginning of the year. The total contribution percentage lies between 5.91% and 26.94%. The participant pays 30% of this contribution, whilst ASML pays the remaining 70%.

2009 Board of Management Remuneration

1. Base salary, short-term performance cash bonus, excluding Performance Stock & Performance Stock Options

1.1. The total remuneration amount of the Board of Management in terms of base salary, bonus, pension cost and other benefits in 2009 compared to 2008 was as follows:

Year ended December 31	2008 EUR	2009 EUR
Salaries	2,073,000	2,106,333 ¹
Bonuses	988,236 ²	1,303,821 ³
Pension cost	249,072	253,683
Other benefits ⁴	266,625	269,617
<i>Total</i>	<i>3,418,707</i>	<i>3,933,454</i>

¹ The slight increase in base salaries for 2009 as compared to 2008 is a result of the inclusion of one month base salary paid to Mr. Schneider-Maunoury in 2009.

² Of the 2008 bonus for the Board of Management as included in the table above, one third part, being EUR 329,412, was paid in ASML shares.

³ As a response to the financial and economic crisis in 2009, the Supervisory Board together with the Board of Management decided to postpone the Board of Management's payment of the 2009 cash bonus (variable pay). Payment will be postponed until the cumulative income from operations after two consecutive quarters, after December 31, 2009, is at least EUR 100 million

⁴ Other benefits include housing costs, company car costs, social security costs, health and disability insurance costs and representation allowances.

1.2. The 2009 remuneration of the individual members of the Board of Management, excluding performance stock and performance stock options, was as follows:

	Received Base Salary EUR	Earned Cash ¹ Bonus EUR	Other benefits ² EUR	Total EUR
E. Meurice	735,000	507,150	141,377	1,383,527
P.T.F.M. Wennink	455,000	251,160	44,886	751,046
M.A. van den Brink	483,000	266,616	44,992	794,608
F.J. van Hout	400,000	220,800	35,199	655,999
F. Schneider-Maunoury ³	33,333	58,095	3,163	94,591

¹ The consolidated statement of operations for the year ended December 31, 2009 includes the actual short-term performance cash bonus of 92% of the target bonus (of 75% or 60% respectively of base salary) earned over the year 2009. This cash bonus will be payable after the first two consecutive quarters starting after December 31, 2009 in which the cumulative income from operations is at least EUR 100 million. For Mr. Meurice this means a payout of 69% of his base salary, for Mr. Wennink, Mr. Van den Brink and Mr. Van Hout a payout of 55.2% of their base salary.

² Other benefits include housing costs, company car costs, social security costs, health and disability insurance costs and representation allowances. For 2009, housing costs are gross amounts (before taxes), whereas for 2008, other benefits are net amounts (after taxes).

³ Mr Schneider-Maunoury's base salary for a full year amounts to EUR 400,000. Mr Schneider Maunoury's appointment to ASML's Board of Management is subject to notification of the General Meeting of Shareholders, scheduled to be held on March 24, 2010. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury received a pro rata total lump sum to accommodate his 2009 short and long term incentives. The cash bonus for Mr. Schneider-Maunoury includes a one-off payment for long term and short term share based compensation for the year 2009.

1.3. The 2009 achievements of the Board of Management with respect to the 2009 short-term quantitative performance criteria were evaluated by the Remuneration Committee in cooperation with the Audit Committee and the Technology and Strategy Committee. The qualitative performance criteria were evaluated by the full Supervisory Board. The results of these evaluations were as follows:

	Score (% of target)
<u>Quantitative targets</u>	90%
<u>Qualitative targets</u>	100%
<u>Total</u>	92%

1.4 The 2008 and 2009 vested pension benefits¹ (in Euros) of individual members of the Board of Management were as follows:

	2008	2009
E. Meurice	91,982	91,950
P.T.F.M. Wennink	56,350	56,317
M.A. van den Brink	59,913	59,880
F.J.van Hout	0	40,800
F.Schneider-Maunoury ²	0	4,736
K.P. Fuchs	40,827	n.a.

¹ Since the pension arrangement for members of the Board of Management is a defined contribution plan, the Company does not have further pension obligations beyond the annual premium contribution.

² Pension benefits relate to December 2009. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury's appointment to ASML's Board of Management is subject to notification of the General Meeting of Shareholders, scheduled to be held on March 24, 2010.

For a summary of all remuneration elements in accordance with book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, see table 1 in the appendix.

2. Performance Stock Options

2.1. For details of stock options held per December 31, 2009 by the members of the Board of Management to purchase ordinary shares of ASML Holding N.V reference is made to tables 2 and 3 in the appendix.

2.2. The actual number of performance stock options which will be granted unconditionally in 2010 in relation to performance achievements over 2009 is as follows.

	Actual number of performance stock options which will be awarded in 2010 for 2009 actual achievement
E. Meurice	84,895
P.T.F.M. Wennink	52,554
M.A. van den Brink	55,788
F.J. van Hout	46,201

3. Performance Stock

3.1. For details of performance stock awarded (un-)conditionally to members of the Board of Management reference is made to tables 2 and 4 in the appendix.

Benefits upon termination of employment

The employment agreements with Messrs. Wennink and Van den Brink do not contain specific provisions regarding benefits upon termination of those agreements. Potential severance payments will be according to applicable law.

Employment agreements for members of the Board of Management appointed after March 31, 2004 (Messrs. Meurice, Van Hout and Schneider-Maunoury) contain specific provisions regarding severance payments. If ASML gives notice of termination of the employment agreement for reasons which are not exclusively or mainly found in acts or omissions of the Board member concerned, a severance payment equal to one year base salary will be made available upon the effective date of termination. This severance payment will also be made available in case a Board member gives notice of termination of the employment agreement in connection with a substantial difference of opinion between the respective executive and the Supervisory Board regarding her / his employment agreement, her / his function or the Company's strategy.

Board members appointed after March 31, 2004 shall also be entitled to the aforementioned severance payments in the event ASML or its legal successor gives notice of termination in connection with a Change of Control (as defined in the employment agreement) or if such Board member gives notice of termination directly related to such Change of Control, and such notice is given within twelve months from the date on which the Change of Control occurs.

Intended changes in the Remuneration Policy for 2010 and beyond

As a result of the review of the amended corporate governance guidelines and the review of developments in the top executive remuneration market place, the Supervisory Board will propose adjustments in the ASML remuneration policy for 2010 to the AGM in March 2010.

The proposed changes especially reflect the shifting focus from the short term to the long term, intend to simplify the policy and are as follows:

- 1) move the value of the short term option incentive into the long term incentive in shares;
- 2) make 20% of the long term incentive subject to achievement of a qualitative target.

The consequences of the proposed changes are such that 1) only the cash bonus will be determined by the achievement of the short term performance criteria; 2) the performance stock options will be abolished, whereby the value of these options will be moved to the long term incentive, which value will be awarded in shares; and 3) the achievement of the long term incentive will be determined for 80% by the achievement of the predetermined level of Return on Average Invested Capital ("ROAIC") as compared to the Peer Group and for 20% by the level of achievement of a qualitative target, to be measured over a three year period.

With respect to the best practice provisions Ultimum Remedium (II.2.10) and Claw Back (II.2.11) of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the Supervisory Board of ASML - per the recommendation of its Remuneration Committee - has decided to implement these provisions in the contractual relationship between the individual Board members and ASML. The Supervisory Board anticipates that, given the legal implications and the need for a diligent process, the actual implementation of these provisions will be finalized in the course of 2010.

Conclusion

Despite the earlier agreed increase of 5% of the base salaries per January 1, 2009, the Board of Management has proposed to fix their base salaries in 2009 on the level of 2008, given the economic circumstances. The Supervisory Board fully supported this proposal.

The short term incentives earned by the Board of Management over the performance year 2009 are relatively high in a year of economic depression, in which also ASML suffered. These incentives are a result of the way in which ASML's Board of Management has managed both the downturn and, in the second half of the year, the revival in ASML's market place. Despite this good performance, the Company does not want to pay these incentives, although fairly earned, in a year of major losses. Therefore the Supervisory Board together with the Board of Management has decided to pay these incentives only when ASML makes serious profits again. This means that the payout of the earned incentives will take place after the first two consecutive quarters after December 31, 2009, in which the cumulative income from operations is at least EUR 100 million.

Appendix

Table 1: Total Remuneration
(pursuant to best practice provision II.2.13a of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code)

Total Remuneration	Financial Year	Fixed remuneration	Variable remuneration	Other benefits ²	Pension ³	Sub total cash remuneration	Share based remuneration		Total
		Base salary	Cash Bonus ¹				Maximum Option awards ^{4,5}	Maximum Share awards ⁴	
E. Meurice	2007	€ 710,000	€ 332,316	€ 93,613	€ 88,844	€ 1,224,773	€ 675,038	€ 1,352,632	€ 3,252,443
	2008	€ 735,000	€ 414,569	€ 102,434	€ 91,982	€ 1,343,985	€ 480,506	€ 980,434	€ 2,804,925
	2009	€ 735,000	€ 507,150	€ 141,377	€ 91,950	€ 1,475,477	€ 486,448	€ 743,876	€ 2,705,801
P.T.F.M. Wennink	2007	€ 440,000	€ 205,942	€ 46,423	€ 45,073	€ 737,438	€ 418,332	€ 838,253	€ 1,994,023
	2008	€ 455,000	€ 205,311	€ 49,209	€ 56,350	€ 765,870	€ 297,456	€ 606,936	€ 1,670,262
	2009	€ 455,000	€ 251,160	€ 44,886	€ 56,317	€ 807,363	€ 301,134	€ 460,495	€ 1,568,992
M.A. van den Brink	2007	€ 460,000	€ 215,303	€ 36,919	€ 47,179	€ 759,401	€ 437,345	€ 876,362	€ 2,073,108
	2008	€ 483,000	€ 217,945	€ 43,686	€ 59,913	€ 804,544	€ 315,760	€ 644,278	€ 1,764,582
	2009	€ 483,000	€ 266,616	€ 44,992	€ 59,880	€ 854,488	€ 319,665	€ 488,827	€ 1,662,980
F.J. van Hout	2007								
	2008								
	2009	€ 400,000	€ 220,800	€ 35,199	€ 40,800	€ 696,799	€ 264,732	€ 404,824	€ 1,366,355
F. Schneider-Maunoury ⁶	2007								
	2008								
	2009	€ 33,333	€ 58,095	€ 3,163	€ 4,736	€ 99,327	€ 0	€ 0	€ 99,327

1 As a response to the financial and economic crisis in 2009, the Company decided to postpone the Board of Management's payment of the 2009 cash bonus (variable pay). Payment will be postponed until the cumulative income from operations after two consecutive quarters, after December 31, 2009, is at least 100 million.

2 Other benefits include housing costs, company car costs, social security costs, health and disability insurance costs and representation allowances. For 2009, housing costs are gross amounts (before taxes), whereas for 2007 and 2008, other benefits are net amounts (after taxes).

3 Since the pension arrangement for members of the Board of Management is a defined contribution plan, the Company does not have additional pension obligations beyond the annual premium contribution.

4 The fair value of the share awards as of the grant date is based on the maximum achievable number of share awards. For actual number of share awards and more details see tables 2, 3 and 4.

5 The fair value of the option awards as of the grant date is based on the maximum achievable number of option awards. In 2008, the number of option awards actually granted was 50%. For more information on actual values reference is made to table 1a.

6 Mr. Schneider-Maunoury's appointment to ASML's Board of Management is subject to notification of the AGM to be held on March 24, 2010. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury's base salary for a full year amounts to EUR 400,000. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury received a pro rata total lump sum to accommodate his 2009 short and long term incentives. The cash bonus for Mr. Schneider-Maunoury includes a one off payment for long term and short term share based compensation for the year 2009.

Table 1a: Total Remuneration (as published earlier)
(including actual option grants, excluding pensions and other benefits)

Total Remuneration	Financial Year	Fixed remuneration	Variable remuneration			Total	% vs. 2007
		Base salary	Cash Bonus (actual)	Options awards (actual) ¹	Share awards (at Maximum)		
E. Meurice	2007	€ 710,000	€ 332,316	€ 641,284	€ 1,352,632	€ 3,036,232	100%
	2008	€ 735,000	€ 414,569	€ 240,256	€ 980,434	€ 2,370,259	78%
	2009	€ 735,000	€ 507,150	€ 486,448	€ 743,876	€ 2,472,474	81%
P.T.F.M. Wennink	2007	€ 440,000	€ 205,942	€ 397,417	€ 838,253	€ 1,881,612	100%
	2008	€ 455,000	€ 205,311	€ 148,728	€ 606,936	€ 1,415,975	75%
	2009	€ 455,000	€ 251,160	€ 301,134	€ 460,495	€ 1,467,789	78%
M.A. van den Brink	2007	€ 460,000	€ 215,303	€ 415,481	€ 876,362	€ 1,967,146	100%
	2008	€ 483,000	€ 217,945	€ 157,880	€ 644,278	€ 1,503,103	76%
	2009	€ 483,000	€ 266,616	€ 319,665	€ 488,827	€ 1,558,108	79%
F.J. van Hout	2007					€ 0	
	2008					€ 0	
	2009	€ 400,000	€ 220,800	€ 264,732	€ 404,824	€ 1,290,356	
F. Schneider-Maunoury	2007					€ 0	
	2008					€ 0	
	2009	€ 33,333	€ 58,095	€ 0	€ 0	€ 91,428	

¹ Option awards (actual) is determined based on the fair value as of the grant date multiplied by the actual number of option awards at the moment of vesting

Table 2: Unvested equity awards - minimum/ maximum numbers
(pursuant to best practice provision II.2.13c of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code)

Unvested equity awards - minimum / maximum numbers	Grant date	Type of grant	Number granted	Vesting date	Number at vesting		End of lock- up period
					Minimum	Maximum	
E. Meurice	2/2/2009	option	84,895	2/2/2010	0	84,895	2/2/2010
	1/17/2007	share	66,338	1/17/2010	0	66,338	1/17/2012
	2/4/2008	share	57,002	2/4/2011	0	57,002	1/16/2013
	2/2/2009	share	57,002	2/2/2012	0	57,002	2/2/2014
P.T.F.M. Wennink	2/2/2009	option	52,554	2/2/2010	0	52,554	2/2/2010
	1/17/2007	share	41,111	1/17/2010	0	41,111	1/17/2012
	2/4/2008	share	35,287	2/4/2011	0	35,287	1/16/2013
	2/2/2009	share	35,287	2/2/2012	0	35,287	2/2/2014
M.A. van den Brink	2/2/2009	option	55,788	2/2/2010	0	55,788	2/2/2010
	1/17/2007	share	42,980	1/17/2010	0	42,980	1/17/2012
	2/4/2008	share	37,458	2/4/2011	0	37,458	1/16/2013
	2/2/2009	share	37,458	2/2/2012	0	37,458	2/2/2014
F.J. van Hout ¹	10/19/2007	share	1,667	10/19/2010	0	1,667	10/19/2010
	7/18/2008	share	4,000	7/18/2011	0	4,000	7/18/2011
	2/2/2009	option	46,201	2/2/2010	0	46,201	2/2/2010
	2/2/2009	share	31,021	2/2/2012	0	31,021	2/2/2014
F. Schneider-Maunoury ²							

¹ The shares awarded to Mr. Van Hout on 10/19/2007 and 7/18/2008 relate to his pre-Board of Management period at ASML.

² Mr. Schneider-Maunoury's appointment to ASML's Board of Management is subject to notification of the AGM to be held on March 24, 2010. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury did not receive any equity awards for the FY 2009.

Table 3: Overview of option awards
(pursuant to best practice provision II.2.13d of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code)

Overview of option awards	At moment of grant							At moment of vesting				Option term
	Grant date	Status	Full control	Number	Exercise price	Fair value ¹	Total value ²	Vesting date	Number	Share price end FY ³	Total intrinsic value ⁴	Expiration date
E. Meurice	1/17/2007	unconditional	no	100,154	€ 20.39	€ 6.74	€ 675,038	1/17/2008	95,146	€ 12.75	€ 0	1/17/2017
	2/4/2008	unconditional	no	84,895	€ 17.20	€ 5.66	€ 480,506	2/4/2009	42,448	€ 24.00	€ 288,646	2/4/2018
	2/2/2009	conditional	no	84,895	€ 12.39	€ 5.73	€ 486,448	2/2/2010	84,895			2/2/2019
P.T.F.M. Wennink	1/17/2007	unconditional	no	62,067	€ 20.39	€ 6.74	€ 418,332	1/17/2008	58,964	€ 12.75	€ 0	1/17/2017
	2/4/2008	unconditional	no	52,554	€ 17.20	€ 5.66	€ 297,456	2/4/2009	26,277	€ 24.00	€ 178,684	2/4/2018
	2/2/2009	conditional	no	52,554	€ 12.39	€ 5.73	€ 301,134	2/2/2010	52,554			2/2/2019
M.A. van den Brink	1/17/2007	unconditional	no	64,888	€ 20.39	€ 6.74	€ 437,345	1/17/2008	61,644	€ 12.75	€ 0	1/17/2017
	2/4/2008	unconditional	no	55,788	€ 17.20	€ 5.66	€ 315,760	2/4/2009	27,894	€ 24.00	€ 189,679	2/4/2018
	2/2/2009	conditional	no	55,788	€ 12.39	€ 5.73	€ 319,665	2/2/2010	55,788			2/2/2019
F.J. van Hout ⁵	10/19/2007	unconditional	yes	1,388	€ 24.26	€ 6.42	€ 8,911	10/19/2008	1,388	€ 12.75	€ 0	10/19/2017
	10/17/2008	unconditional	yes	3,987	€ 11.43	€ 6.52	€ 25,995	10/17/2009	3,987	€ 24.00	€ 50,117	10/17/2018
	2/2/2009	conditional	no	46,201	€ 12.39	€ 5.73	€ 264,732	2/2/2010	46,201			2/2/2019
F. Schneider-Maunoury ⁶												

¹ The fair value of the options as of the grant date.

² Value is calculated by multiplying number of options by the fair value.

³ The share price as of the end of the financial year of vesting.

⁴ Intrinsic value is calculated by multiplying the number of option awards by the share price as of the end of the financial year of vesting -/- the exercise price.

⁵ The options granted to Mr. Van Hout on 10/19/2007 and 10/17/2008 relate to his pre-Board of Management period at ASML

⁶ Mr. Schneider-Maunoury's appointment to ASML's Board of Management is subject to notification of the AGM to be held on March 24, 2010. Mr. Schneider-Maunoury did not receive any equity awards for the FY 2009.

Table 4: Overview of share awards (as per December 31, 2009)
(pursuant to best practice provision II.2.13d of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code)

Overview of share awards	At moment of grant						At moment of vesting				At end of lock-up period			
	Grant date	Status	Full Control	Number	Fair value ¹	Total value ²	Vesting date	Number	Share price end FY ³	Total value ⁴	End of lock-up	Number	Share price end FY ⁵	Value at end lock-up ⁶
E. Meurice	10/22/2004	Unconditional	yes	5,845	€ 10.91	€ 63,769	10/20/2007	5,845	€ 21.66	€ 126,603	10/20/2009	5,845	€ 24.00	€ 140,280
	1/19/2005	Unconditional	no	36,972	€ 11.53	€ 426,287	1/19/2008	36,972	€ 12.75	€ 471,393	1/19/2010			
	1/18/2006	Unconditional	no	72,136	€ 17.90	€ 1,291,234	1/18/2009	72,136	€ 24.00	€ 1,731,264	1/18/2011			
	1/17/2007	Conditional	no	66,338	€ 20.39	€ 1,352,632	1/17/2010				1/17/2012			
	2/4/2008	Conditional	no	57,002	€ 17.20	€ 980,434	2/4/2011				1/16/2013			
	2/2/2009	Conditional	no	57,002	€ 13.05	€ 743,876	2/2/2012				2/2/2014			
P.T.F.M. Wennink	1/19/2005	Unconditional	no	20,721	€ 11.53	€ 238,913	1/19/2008	20,721	€ 12.75	€ 264,193	1/19/2010			
	1/18/2006	Unconditional	no	45,905	€ 17.90	€ 821,700	1/18/2009	45,905	€ 24.00	€ 1,101,720	1/18/2011			
	1/17/2007	Conditional	no	41,111	€ 20.39	€ 838,253	1/17/2010				1/17/2012			
	2/4/2008	Conditional	no	35,287	€ 17.20	€ 606,936	2/4/2011				1/16/2013			
	2/2/2009	Conditional	no	35,287	€ 13.05	€ 460,495	2/2/2012				2/2/2014			
M.A. van den Brink	1/19/2005	Unconditional	no	25,902	€ 11.53	€ 298,650	1/19/2008	25,902	€ 12.75	€ 330,251	1/19/2010			
	1/18/2006	Unconditional	no	48,241	€ 17.90	€ 863,514	1/18/2009	48,241	€ 24.00	€ 1,157,784	1/18/2011			
	1/17/2007	Conditional	no	42,980	€ 20.39	€ 876,362	1/17/2010				1/17/2012			
	2/4/2008	Conditional	no	37,458	€ 17.20	€ 644,278	2/4/2011				1/16/2013			
	2/2/2009	Conditional	no	37,458	€ 13.05	€ 488,827	2/2/2012				2/2/2014			
F.J. van Hout ⁷	10/19/2007	Conditional	no	1,667	€ 24.26	€ 40,441	10/19/2010				10/19/2010			
	7/18/2008	Conditional	no	4,000	€ 14.87	€ 59,480	7/18/2011				7/18/2011			
	2/2/2009	Conditional	no	31,021	€ 13.05	€ 404,824	2/2/2012				2/2/2014			
F. Schneider-Maunoury ⁸														

¹ The fair value of the shares as of the grant date.

² Total value is calculated by multiplying number of shares by the share price as of the end of the financial year of grant.

³ The share price as of the end of the financial year of vesting.

⁴ Total value is calculated by multiplying number of shares by the share price as of the end of the financial year of vesting.

⁵ The share price as of the end of the financial year in which the lock-up period ends.

⁶ Value is calculated by multiplying number of shares by the share price as of the end of the financial year in which the lock-up period ends.